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This paper estimates the impact of the Specialist Schools initiative and the Excellence in Cities 
programme on the attainment of secondary school pupils in England. The focus is on their relative 
impact across gender and ethnic groups. Using pupil-level data, we find that both policies have had 
positive effects on test score gain but that these effects vary substantially between boys and girls and 
across ethnic groups. Both policies have been more effective for boys than for girls. The Excellence in 
Cities programme is estimated have had a positive impact on the test score gain of ethnic minority 
pupils but not for whites, who have benefited only from the Specialist Schools initiative. The greatest 
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1.  Introduction  
Governments across the world recognise that educational attainment is a critical factor in economic 
and social advancement. Evidence of the belief in the power of education to bring economic 
improvements is clearly indicated by global trends in public expenditure on education over recent 
decades. Both total educational expenditure and expenditure per pupil have been on an upward trend 
in OECD countries in recent decades (OECD 2008).
2 It is also widely recognised that education is the 
key to breaking down barriers to intergenerational mobility, so that pupils from economically deprived 
families can escape from poverty through educational achievement, and hence achieve greater success 
in the labour market than attained by their parents.   
The question facing policymakers is how educational outcomes can be improved, especially 
for the economically underprivileged since it is primarily this group that suffers from poor educational 
attainment and consequently low skill levels. There has been intense debate amongst economists about 
how public education should be delivered and the extent to which extra resources will lead to 
improvements in educational outcomes (Hanushek 2003, Krueger 2003). At one end of the spectrum 
are those who argue that the provision of education should be controlled by central government on the 
grounds that a decentralised approach will lead to socio-economic segregation and ultimately to the 
reinforcement of income inequalities (Levin 1991a, 1991b). At the other extreme are those who have 
challenged the traditional model of centralised provision (following Friedman 1962). They argue for a 
decentralised approach on the grounds that this is likely to increase both allocative and productive 
efficiency (Hoxby 1996).  
In recent years, several countries including the UK have moved towards a more decentralised 
system characterised by greater parental choice, delegation of expenditure decisions to schools, 
competition for pupils between schools thereby permitting school enrolment to respond to demand for 
places, and contracting educational services out to private suppliers. In other words, there has been a 
deliberate shift towards the creation of a quasi-market in educational provision. These and other 
policies have been the hallmark of several radical changes to education policy in England since the 
early 1990s following the Education Reform Act of 1988. The reforms of the early 1990s received a 
major boost after Labour came to power in 1997. Expenditure per pupil increased by around 50% in 
real terms during 1997-2007 and many new policy initiatives have been introduced in an attempt to 
improve the educational outcomes of primary and secondary school pupils.
3  
Two flagship policies directed specifically at secondary school pupils are the focus of the 
present paper. The Specialist Schools initiative and the Excellence in Cities (EiC) programme have 
                                                 
2 For the OECD as a whole, public expenditure on education as a proportion of the public budget increased from 
11.9% to 13.2% between 1995 and 2005; while the index of (real) expenditure per student increased from 89 in 
1995 to 119 in 2005 (2000=100) in primary, secondary and other non-tertiary education. See Education at a 
Glance 2008: OECD Indicators. The website is http://fiordiliji.sourceoecd.org/pdf/factbook2008/302008011e-
09-02-03.pdf  
3 Total real public expenditure on secondary schools in England increased by 60% from £9.9b in 1997/98 to 
£15.8b in 2006/7, and real expenditure per FTE pupil increased by over 50%, from £3206 in 1997/98 to £4836 in 
2006/07 (at 2005/6 prices). See DCSF, Annual Report 2007, p.102 and Annual Report 2008, p.150, annex N. 2 
 
provided extra resources to schools in the form of capital grants and increased recurrent spending. The 
Specialist Schools initiative, which began in 1994, sought to raise attainment by inducing all 
qualifying secondary schools to specialise in subjects in which they have a comparative advantage, 
thereby increasing diversity and providing parents with greater school choice. The EiC programme 
took a more targeted approach to raising attainment by deliberately focusing resources, from its 
inception in 1999, on schools in deprived inner city areas with low levels of attainment and a high 
proportion of pupils from poor families.  
Previous attempts to estimate the impact of these two resource-based policies have focused 
primarily on each policy separately. The Specialist Schools initiative, for example, has been evaluated 
by Levacic and Jenkins (2004) and by Taylor (2007), while the EiC programme has been the focus of 
papers by Kendall et al. (2005) and Machin, McNally and Meghir (2007).
4 Since the two policies ran 
concurrently from 1999, there is a strong case for investigating their simultaneous impact on 
educational attainment. The only previous paper attempting to estimate the impact of both policies 
simultaneously uses school-level data (Bradley and Taylor 2008). The present paper extends previous 
work in two directions. First, we use pupil-level data. Second, we estimate the impact of the two 
policies on pupils in schools with only specialist status, schools with only EiC status and schools with 
both specialist and EiC status simultaneously. This approach should help to ascertain which, if any, of 
the two policies has been successful in raising attainment, and whether there have been any advantages 
in schools having both policies rather than just one.  
An issue of crucial importance in estimating the impact of resource-based policies concerns 
their distributional consequences. This issue is particularly important for UK policymakers in view of 
the wide gender and ethnic disparities in educational outcomes at the end of compulsory education. A 
critical feature of these disparities in attainment is the considerable widening that occurs during the 
final two years of compulsory education, as shown in Figure 1. Ethnic disparities in attainment are 
shown separately for boys and girls in Figures 2 and 3. For both boys and girls, Asian pupils improve 
their position relative to whites during the final two years of compulsory education whilst Black 
Caribbean pupils fall even further behind. 
Although both gender and ethnic differences in attainment have been investigated extensively 
in previous research, very little progress has yet been made in identifying and quantifying the causes 
of these disparities (Burgess et al. 2004; Wilson, Burgess and Briggs 2005; Andrews et al. 2007; 
Casson and Kingdom 2007; Kingdom and Casson 2007). A primary concern of the present paper is 
therefore to investigate the distributional impact of the Specialist Schools initiative and the EiC 
programme on pupil attainment according to their gender and ethnicity. The Specialist Schools 
initiative, for instance, has favoured schools with above average attainment levels, whereas the EiC 
programme has specifically targeted schools with low attainment and a high proportion of pupils from 
                                                 
4 Papers published in education journals include Gorard (2002), Levacic and Jenkins (2004), Schagen and 
Goldstein (2002) and Noden and Schagen (2006). 3 
 
poor families.
5 We therefore seek to discover not only the extent to which these two policies have been 
effective in raising overall test scores but also their gender and ethnic impacts. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly outlines the Specialist 
Schools initiative and the EiC programme and reviews previous attempts to estimate their impact on 
educational attainment. Section 3 explains our econometric approach and describes the data and 
variables used in the statistical analysis, while section 4 discusses the results. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Previous studies of the effect of the Specialist Schools initiative and the EiC programme on 
test scores 
Despite their high profile, there have been few comprehensive evaluations of the Specialist Schools 
initiative and the EiC programme. This section briefly reviews some of the main attempts at estimating 
the impact of these two policies on test scores and exam results.   
 
2.1 Specialist schools 
The Specialist Schools initiative began in 1994 with the designation of technology colleges in selected 
secondary schools in England. By 2007, over 85% of all secondary schools in England had specialist 
status in at least one of ten available subject areas.
6 The original aim was that all secondary schools in 
England would eventually have specialist status (Levacic and Jenkins 2004), the intention being to 
improve attainment through schools specialising in the subjects in which they have a comparative 
advantage and through pupil preferences being matched more closely with a school’s syllabus.  
  Schools have been incentivised to apply for specialist status by a capital grant from the 
government of £100,000 together with extra annual funding of £129 per pupil, thereby increasing 
income by around 5% per annum over a period of at least four years following designation of 
specialist status. The requirement to obtain matched private sector funding to supplement the initial 
capital grant resulted in a strong funding bias in the earlier years of the initiative towards schools with 
‘good’ exam results, as indicated by the proportion of pupils with five or more A* to C grades in the 
GCSE exams at the end of compulsory education (age 16). This effectively meant that schools with 
‘poor’ exam results (and a correspondingly high proportion of pupils from families on income support) 
were far less likely to acquire specialist status in earlier years since private capital endowments have 
favoured schools with ‘good’ exam results (Bradley and Taylor, 2008). The selectivity of specialist 
schools is evident from Table 1, which shows that specialist schools had the lowest proportion of 
                                                 
5 The percent of pupils eligible for free school meals was 14.7% for specialist schools and 20.7% for non-
specialist schools in 2006. For the first phase of the EiC programme in 1999/2000, the corresponding 
percentages of pupils eligible for free school meals were 35.6% for participants in the programme and 14.7% for 
non-participants.   
6 The specialisms were introduced as follows: technology colleges in 1994, languages in 1995; arts and sport in 
1997; business & enterprise, engineering, maths & computing, and science in 2002; and humanities and music in 
2004. A vocational specialism was added in September 2007 and schools have also been allowed to specialise in 
more than one subject. In 2006/7, 10% of all maintained secondary schools had two specialisms.  See the 
following web site at the DCSF for further details: http://www.standards.dfes.gov.uk/specialistschools/.  4 
 
pupils eligible for free school meals, the lowest proportion of non-white pupils and the highest test 
score at the end of primary schooling (in the 2003 cohort of pupils).    
  There is conflicting evidence on the success of the Specialist Schools initiative. Evidence of a 
positive effect of specialist status on exam performance is provided, for example, in studies 
commissioned by the Specialist Schools Trust (Jesson and Crossley, 2004) and by OFSTED (2005). 
These claims have led the Government to argue that the programme has been extremely successful, a 
view vigorously challenged by the Education and Skills Committee of the House of Commons (House 
of Commons, 2003, p.4). Furthermore, methodological weaknesses of previous analyses have been 
identified by Schagen and Goldstein (2002), who are especially critical of the school-level analyses 
conducted by the Specialist Schools Trust.
7 They argue that multi-level modelling techniques should 
be used to take into account the multi-level structure of the data. Taylor (2007) argues that all previous 
studies suffer from a fundamental flaw:  no attempt has been made to investigate whether the switch to 
specialist status has been associated with a subsequent change in a school’s performance. When the 
focus is switched to changes in performance over time, rather than being based on simple cross-
sectional analyses at a point in time, it is estimated that the Specialist Schools initiative raised exam 
results by around one percentage point on average (compared to the claim of between 4 and 5 
percentage points by the Specialist Schools Trust), though there is evidence of more substantial 
impacts for specific areas of specialisation, such as business studies and technology. 
   
2.2 EiC Partnerships 
In contrast to the Specialist Schools initiative, the EiC policy explicitly targets pupils from 
disadvantaged backgrounds, especially in metropolitan areas (see Table 1). Launched in 1999, the 
programme  initially included all secondary schools in 25 local education authorities in the major 
cities of England, and was subsequently extended in 2000 (phase 2) and again in 2001 (phase 3).
8 By 
2006, the programme was organised into 57 partnerships, covering approximately one third of all 
secondary schools. Total funding for the EiC programme during the period 1999-2006 was 
approximately £1.7b, with per pupil funding of around £140 per year. Specifically, the EiC 
programme had three main elements: first, the establishment of learning mentors, to provide support 
for pupils with educational or behavioural difficulties; second, learning support units, to provide short-
term support for ‘difficult-to-teach’ pupils; and third, the gifted and talented programme focused on 
the most able 5-10% of pupils in schools supported by the EiC programme. The aim of the programme 
has been to improve attainment by raising the motivation and expectations of pupils through providing 
more personal support to pupils and changing the ethos of low attaining schools. 
  There have been relatively few attempts, however, to evaluate the impact of the EiC 
programme. In a comprehensive review, Kendall et al. (2005) conclude that the programme created a 
                                                 
7 See also the comprehensive evaluation by Levacic and Jenkins (2004). 
8 See ‘EiC 1999-2006’ on the Standards Site, DCSF (http://www.standards.dcsf.gov.uk/sie/eic/) for more 
information about the programme. 5 
 
positive ethos towards learning, resulting in improved pupil motivation, behaviour and attendance. 
Improvements in test scores, however, were confined to maths at the end of Key Stage 3 and to pupils 
in the most disadvantaged schools. In further work, Machin, McNally and Meghir (2004, 2007) 
indicate that the short-run impact of the EiC programme has been modest, increasing the probability of 
attaining a grade 5 in maths (on a seven-point scale at age 14) by between 1.9 and 3.4 percentage 
points. No evidence was found, however, of an impact on the test score in English. Two further 
findings by Machin et al. are, first, that the EiC policy has become more effective over time (as phases 
1, 2 and 3 have unfolded); and second, that higher ability pupils benefited from the EiC programme 
more than lower ability pupils. Similar results have been obtained by Bradley and Taylor (2009) using 
a panel of secondary schools in England over the period 1993-2006. They estimate that the EiC 
programme raised the percentage of pupils achieving five or more A* to C grades at age 16 by 3 
percentage points; and that the programme’s biggest impact was on schools with a high proportion of 
ethnic minority pupils. As in Machin et al., Bradley and Taylor find that the impact of the EiC 
programme increased over time.   
 
3. Estimation method and data 
3.1 Econometric methodology 
Our econometric modelling is based on the education production function (Hanushek, 1979, 1986, 
1996). We begin with the following general form: 
 
    (,,) is is is s Yf  PFS      ( 1 )  
 
where Y refers to test score of pupil i in school s; P indexes observed pupil characteristics, such as 
gender and ethnicity; F refers to family characteristics, such as whether a pupil’s parents receive 
income support; and S represents a set of school inputs, such as the pupil-teacher ratio or whether a 
school is coeducational.  
Given our focus on the effects of the two education policy initiatives on educational outcomes, 
equation 1 can be extended to include policy variables: 
 
    (,,, , ) is is is s s s Y f SPEC EiC  PFS     (2) 
 
where SPEC refers to whether a school had specialist status during the pupil’s time at the school. EiC 
has an equivalent definition with respect to EiC status. Both SPEC and EiC are binary variables 
indicating whether a school had specialist or EiC status during the year in which the test was taken. 
The existence of specialist schools adds to the diversity of educational provision in an education 
district and hence allows pupils to choose schools that better match their preferences and aptitudes. To 
the extent that this choice improves allocative efficiency, we expect SPEC to have a positive effect on 
educational outcomes. The extra funding provided under the EiC programme was targeted at schools 6 
 
with a high proportion of pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds, particularly in inner city 
metropolitan areas. The aim was to improve the exam performance of pupils in ‘poor’ schools through 
providing extra teaching and mentoring resources. We therefore expect the EiC programme to have a 
positive effect on the exam performance of pupils. Since Britain’s ethnic minority population tends to 
be clustered in the poorest inner city areas, we expect these pupils to benefit most from the EiC 
programme.  
A pupil’s educational development, however, is a cumulative process, influenced by the 
history of family and school inputs as well as unobserved inherited endowments. Since family history 
and other relevant explanatory variables are not normally observed in survey data, prior attainment is 
often included on the right hand side to capture these missing variables. The inclusion of prior 
attainment as an explanatory variable, however, is likely to cause estimation problems due to 
endogeneity (Todd and Wolpin, 2003, 2007). This may be compounded by measurement error 
embodied in indicators of achievement used in empirical studies, such as test scores. An alternative 
measure of attainment that is likely to present fewer estimation problems is test score gain (i.e. value 
added) during secondary schooling (Hanushek et al. 2005). Using test score gain as the dependent 
variable means that the explanatory variables can be restricted to those likely to influence the 
acquisition of knowledge during secondary schooling. Following Hanushek et al. (2005), our 
educational attainment model therefore focuses on the relationship between test score gain and the 
flow of inputs during secondary schooling. Focusing on the gain in a pupil’s attainment during 
secondary schooling rather than on the level of attainment will automatically control for the impact of 
any time-constant determinants of attainment. Controlling for fixed pupil level effects should therefore 
help to provide more reliable estimates of the impact of the Specialist Schools initiative and the EiC 
programme on attainment during secondary schooling. 
Using test score gain to measure attainment is not, however, problem-free. Test score gain is 
likely to be greater for those with a low initial test score than for those with a high initial test score due 
to mean reversion resulting from measurement error. The fact that the test score is bounded will 
exacerbate the mean reversion problem since pupils with low initial test scores have nowhere to go but 
up, whereas those with high initial test scores have nowhere to go but down.
9 One way of dealing with 
this problem is to calculate a decile-standardised measure of test score gain (see Hanushek et al. 
2005).  This involves calculating a separate standardised test score gain for each decile in the initial 
attainment distribution so that individual pupils are compared not with all pupils in the sample but 
only with pupils in the same part of the initial attainment distribution as themselves.  
Assuming a linear relationship between test score gain (Gain) and the explanatory variables, 
our test score gain model is as follows: 
  
     123 4 5 is is is s s s is Gain SPEC EiC        P β F β S β    (3) 
                                                 
9 This is confirmed by the highly significant negative correlation between the raw (unstandardised) test score 
gain and the initial level of attainment in our dataset (r = -0.43). 7 
 
 
where the error term ε captures the effect of unobservables as well as measurement error in the test 
score. Our interest in this paper is focused entirely on β4 and β5. The regressions are estimated 
separately for boys and girls since it is possible that the impact of policy measures may differ by 
gender. In addition, ethnicity is interacted with the two policy variables (SPEC and EiC) since we are 
interested in whether these policies had differential impacts across ethnic groups.
 10  
A further modification to our estimation strategy is to select a control group that includes only 
‘untreated’ schools. The test score gain of pupils in treated schools is therefore compared directly with 
the test score gain of pupils in untreated schools, which comprised around 50% of all schools in 2003 
(see Table 2). We note that the test score gain varied markedly between the policy categories. Table 3 
shows that the test score gain was highest on average for schools with specialist status and lowest for 
schools with EiC status. Since some schools were treated with only one of the two policies while 
others were treated with both policies simultaneously, the impact of the two policies is estimated 
separately for the Specialist Schools initiative and the EiC programme as well as for the simultaneous 
impact of these two policies.
11 In addition, policy effects are estimated for boys and girls separately so 
that the control group includes only pupils of the same gender in both cases. Boys in schools in each 
policy category are therefore compared only with boys in the control group of untreated schools; and 
similarly for girls.  
 
3.2  Data and variables 
The data used in this paper were obtained from two primary sources: the National Pupil Database 
(NPD) and the annual Schools’ Census. Both datasets were obtained from the Department for 
Children, Schools and Families (DCSF) and the data are for pupils who were in their final year of 
compulsory education in maintained (state-funded) secondary schools in England in 2003.
12 The NPD 
provides pupil level data, such as test scores (at specified Key Stages), as well as personal and family 
background variables such as gender, ethnicity, eligibility for free school meals and whether a pupil 
has special educational needs. In addition, the NPD identifies the school attended at each Key Stage. 
This makes it possible to incorporate school-level variables in the regression model, such as the pupil / 
teacher ratio, a school’s admissions policy, the proportion of pupils eligible for free school meals, the 
proportion with special educational needs and the proportion with English as their second language.  
  In England, pupils are tested at five Key Stages: Key Stage 1 (age 7/8), Key Stage 2 (age 
10/11), Key Stage 3 (age 13/14), Key Stage 4 (age 15/16) and Key Stage 5 (17/18). Key Stage 2 refers 
                                                 
10 In a previous paper, we have shown that, after controlling for family background, school inputs and 
neighbourhood characteristics, pupils from Asian families perform substantially better in national exams than 
whites (Bradley and Taylor, 2004).   
11 Equation (3) was also estimated using a more restricted control group. Schools were selected for inclusion in 
the control group only if their test score (at the end of Key Stage 2 in the year preceding the entry of the 2003 
cohort into secondary schooling) was within one standard deviation of the mean of the test score in the relevant 
treated group of schools. The results were found to be very similar in most cases and the conclusions are 
unaffected by the amendment. These additional results are available in working paper. 
12 Data on specialist schools and EiC status were obtained from the DCSF website. 8 
 
to the tests taken at the end of primary schooling and Key Stage 3 and 4 tests are taken during 
secondary schooling, which is the focus of this paper.
13 The Key Stage 4 test (known as the 
GCSE/GNVQ
14) is particularly salient since it determines whether a pupil stays on in further (and 
hence higher) education. The dependent variable is therefore constructed from test scores obtained by 
pupils at ages 13/14 and 15/16. At age 13/14, pupils sit tests in three subjects (English, maths and 
science) and the test score used here is the average points score over the three subjects. Pupils in their 
final year of compulsory schooling at age 15/16 typically sit exams in up to ten subjects. Once again, 
we calculate the average points score for each pupil. Since the test scores for Key Stages 3 and 4 are 
measured on entirely different scales, the scores at each Key Stage have to be normalised (with mean 
zero and standard deviation one) before calculating the test score gain for each pupil between Key 
Stages 3 and 4. Finally, the test score gain is then divided into deciles and the test score gain within 
each decile is then normalised (following Hanushek et al. 2005). The variables used in the regression 
analysis are shown in Table A in the appendix.  
 
4. Results 
This section presents the estimated impact of the specialist schools and EiC policies on test score gain 
during the final two years of compulsory education, using pupil and school level data for those pupils 
who completed compulsory education in 2003. Policy impacts are estimated for: (i) pupils in schools 
with only specialist status, (ii) pupils in schools with only EiC status, and (iii) pupils in schools with 
both specialist and EiC status simultaneously (all during a pupil’s final two years of compulsory 
schooling). In all three cases, pupils in treated schools are compared with pupils in schools which did 
not have either specialist or EiC status (namely, untreated schools). Estimates are provided for boys 
and girls separately. We note initially that the difference in test score gain between pupils in treated 
schools and pupils in non-treated schools was greater for boys than for girls across virtually all ethnic 
groups (see Table 4). This provides an additional justification for undertaking a separate analysis for 
boys and girls.  
The estimated policy impact for all pupils is provided in Table 5. The main points to note are, 
first, that the specialist schools policy is positively related to test score gain for all ethnic groups (but 
is statistically insignificant for Pakistanis and Bangladeshis) with an estimated impact on test score 
gain of around 0.14 of a standard deviation for the significant coefficients. Second, the EiC policy is 
significantly related to test score gain for all ethnic groups except whites and Indians, with the 
estimated impact reaching 0.14 and 0.19 of a standard deviation for Pakistanis and Bangladeshis 
respectively. The EiC policy appears to have had no impact on whites and Indians. Third, the strongest 
                                                 
13 The tests taken at the end of Key Stage 3 were abolished after the 2008 tests due to criticisms that these were 
harmful to the teaching process. The other Key Stage tests and exams have been retained. 
14 GCSE refers to the General Certificate of Secondary Education and GNVQ is the General National Vocational 
Qualification. The test score in each subject is graded A* to G. These are converted to points and then summed 
across all subjects (A* = 8, A = 7, B = 6 and so on to G = 1).  9 
 
policy impacts are estimated to have occurred for ethnic minority pupils in schools which had both 
specialist and EiC status simultaneously.  
We note that the estimated coefficients on the variables used as controls are consistent with 
previous studies. The estimated coefficient on the gender dummy, for example, indicates that the test 
score gain for girls exceeded that for boys by around one quarter of a standard deviation. We also note 
that the test score gain for all ethnic minority groups is significantly larger than for whites once 
controls for other family characteristics (such as eligibility for free school meals and whether a pupil 
has special educational needs) are included in the regression model. These results are similar to those 
found in earlier studies, so we do not discuss them further here (Bradley and Taylor 2004).  
The results for boys and girls separately are given in Table 6. Test score gain is positively 
related to specialist schools status across all ethnic groups for boys, with the largest estimated impact 
being for black Caribbeans (0.23). This positive impact of specialist schools on test score gain for boys 
contrasts sharply with the results obtained for girls. A statistically significant impact of specialist 
status on test score gain is obtained only for white and Indian girls and not for any other ethnic group. 
The estimated impact of the EiC policy is also estimated to vary by gender and ethnic group. For boys, 
the main impact of the EiC policy has been on blacks and Pakistanis, whereas for girls, the main 
impact has been on Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. There is no evidence, however, that either whites or 
Indians benefitted from the EiC policy.  
The strongest impact of the two policies is estimated to have occurred for pupils in schools 
which have had both specialist and EiC status simultaneously. The evidence is particularly strong for 
boys. The estimated impact of the two policies, for example, is at least 0.2 of a standard deviation for 
boys in all ethnic minority groups, rising to over 0.34 standard deviations for blacks and Bangladeshis. 
The estimated impact of the two policies when used together is less impressive for girls, with the 
exception of Bangladeshis.  
Our main conclusions from the regression analysis are as follows.  First, the estimated policy 
impact on test score gain of both the specialist schools and EiC policies has been greater for boys than 
for girls. Boys therefore appear to have responded more positively to both policies than has been the 
case for girls. Second, EiC status appears to have had a consistently positive effect on test score gain 
except for whites and Indians, both of whom have benefited more from specialist status than from EiC 
status. Third, the estimated joint impact of the two policies is generally in line with the sum of the two 
separate impacts. We have found no evidence of any scale economies resulting from having specialist 
and EiC status simultaneously. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper has been to estimate the impact of the Specialist Schools initiative and the 
Excellence in Cities programme on the educational attainment of secondary school pupils in England. 
A comparison of the relative effectiveness of these two policies is of interest since they have depended 
on similar amounts of funding but were based on entirely different approaches to achieving the same 10 
 
objective, namely, to raise educational attainment at the end of compulsory education. Thus, whereas 
the Specialist Schools initiative attempted to raise attainment through increasing the diversity between 
schools, thereby increasing choice for pupils, the EiC programme was designed to raise attainment by 
providing more educational support to pupils living in economically deprived inner city areas. In view 
of the wide variation in educational outcomes between boys and girls in different ethnic groups, this 
paper has focused specifically on gender as well as ethnic differences in the consequences of the 
Specialist Schools initiative and the EiC programme.  
The two primary questions we have addressed are ‘how effective have these two policies 
been?’ and ‘who has benefited the most from these policies?’ In answer to the first question, we have 
found that both the Specialist Schools initiative and the EiC programme are estimated to have had a 
positive impact on the test score gain during the final two years of compulsory education. The 
estimated impact, however, differs between boys and girls and between ethnic groups. Our main 
findings are as follows: (i) the estimated impact of the Specialist Schools initiative has generally been 
greater for boys than for girls; (ii) the estimated impact of the EiC programme has been mixed, with 
blacks and Pakistanis benefitting the most for boys, and Pakistanis and Bangladeshis benefitting the 
most for girls; (iii) the EiC programme had no discernible impact on whites or Indians; (iv) no 
evidence could be found of any scale economies for those schools which had both specialist and EiC 
status.  An interesting next step would be to investigate the reasons lying behind the differential 
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 TABLE 1   Characteristics of schools by policy category, 2003 cohort 
 
Characteristics of schools  Policy category 
 
 SS  =  0 
EiC = 0 
SS = 1 
EiC = 0 
SS = 0 
EiC = 1 
SS = 1 
EiC = 1 


























Notes: (  ) = standard deviation; SS = Specialist Schools initiative; EiC = Excellence in Cities 





TABLE 2   Number of schools (pupils) in each policy category during  
Key Stage 4 (2003) , 2003 cohort 
 
  Specialist Schools initiative 
 
 





EiC Programme       










      
Total 2207  921  3128 
Notes: (  ) = number of pupils; SS = Specialist Schools initiative; EiC = Excellence in 












Test score gain 
during Key 
Stage 4 
Boys    
SS=0, EiC=0  111,989 -0.18 
SS=1, EiC=0  62,047 -0.01 
SS=0, EiC=1   43,314 -0.22 
SS=1, EiC=1   21,902 -0.07 
All boys  239,252 -0.13 
    
Girls    
SS=0, EiC=0   110,075 0.09 
SS=1, EiC=0  62,250 0.24 
SS=0, EiC=1   43,456 0.06 
SS=1, EiC=1   24,107 0.18 
All girls  239,888 0.13 
Notes: SS = Specialist Schools initiative; EiC = Excellence in Cities 













TABLE 4   Difference in test score gain between pupils in treated and non-treated schools:  
by policy category and gender, 2003 cohort 
 
  Difference in test score gain between treated & non-treated schools 
 
  Boys 
 
Girls Difference 
(Boys – Girls) 
 SS-NT  EiC-NT  (SS+EiC) 
-NT 
SS-NT EiC-NT  (SS+EiC) 
-NT 
SS-NT EiC-NT (SS+EiC) 
-NT 
White 0.16  -0.12  0.03  0.15  -0.11  0.02  0.01  -0.01  0.01 
Black  Caribbean  0.24  0.13 0.29  0.08 -0.01  0.10  0.16  0.14 0.19 
Black African  0.18  0.12  0.26  0.10  0.00  0.15  0.08  0.12  0.11 
Indian 0.22  0.01  0.17  0.14  0.00  0.05  0.08  0.01  0.12 
Pakistani 0.20  0.10  0.21  0.10  0.09  0.13  0.10  0.01  0.08 
Bangladeshi 0.18  -0.09  0.17  0.11  0.09  0.33  0.07  -0.18  -0.16 
Other 0.16  -0.02  0.35  0.08  -0.01  0.19  0.08  -0.01  0.16 
Unknown 0.30  0.16  0.20  0.22  0.07  0.13  0.08  0.09  0.07 
Notes:  Test score gain is measured as a standard normal variable with mean zero and standard deviation one.   






TABLE 5   Estimated impact on test score gain of specialist schools and EiC status: by policy category 
 
 
Explanatory variables  Dependent variable = test score gain  
between Key Stage 3 (age 14) and  
Key Stage 4 (age 16) 
 
  Policy category 
  SS = 1  
EiC = 0 
SS = 0  
EiC = 1 
SS = 1  
EiC = 1 
Ethnicity x policy category 
 
    










































Pupil and family characteristics 
 











































Whether changed school after end of 

































Duration in same school as sat Key 















    














TABLE 5 continued 
 
 












































































      
R
2 0.10  0.09  0.09 
Number of observations  342664  303021  264586 
Notes:  
i. Dependent variable = value added between Key Stage 3 and Key Stage 4. SS = Specialist Schools initiative; 
EiC = Excellence in Cities Partnership; 0 = policy–off, 1 = policy-on.  
ii. The control group for each equation is restricted to pupils in schools which did not have specialist status and 
were not in an EiC partnership during Key Stage 4.  
iii. *, **, *** refer to significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The standard errors of the regression 











  Dependent variable = test score gain  
during Key Stage 4 
 
Explanatory variables  Policy category 
  SS = 1  
EiC = 0 
SS = 0  
EiC = 1 
SS = 1  
EiC = 1 
Ethnicity x policy category 
 
   










































      
R
2 0.09  0.08  0.09 
Number of observations  171902  152089  131921 
Notes: See notes to Table 5. The estimated coefficients for the variables used as controls are the same as 




  Dependent variable = test score gain  
during Key Stage 4 
 
Explanatory variables  Policy category 
  SS = 1  
EiC = 0 
SS = 0  
EiC = 1 
SS = 1  
EiC = 1 
Ethnicity x policy category 
 
   










































     
R
2  0.07 0.07 0.07 
Number  of  observations  170762 150932 132665 
Notes: See notes to Table 5. The estimated coefficients for the variables used as controls are the same as 





Descriptive statistics for the 2003 cohort of pupils 
 
Variables used in regression analysis  Boys  Girls 
 N  Mean  Standard 
deviation 
N Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Pupil-level variables           
Test score gain during Key Stage 4 (decile-standardized)   239252  -0.131  1.007  239888  0.130  0.976 
White 270371  0.864  0.342  263762  0.864  0.342 
Black Caribbean  270371  0.013  0.112  263762  0.013  0.114 
Black other  270371  0.016  0.124  263762  0.017  0.129 
Indian 270371  0.024  0.154  263762  0.024  0.153 
Pakistani 270371  0.023  0.151  263762  0.022  0.145 
Bangladeshi 270371  0.009  0.092  263762  0.009  0.092 
Other ethnic  270371  0.023  0.150  263762  0.025  0.155 
Ethnicity not specified  270371  0.028  0.165  263762  0.027  0.163 
Changed school during secondary schooling  270372  0.023  0.150  263762  0.025  0.155 
Eligible for free school meals  269602  0.143  0.350  263523  0.146  0.353 
English is second language at home  270037  0.077  0.266  263573  0.076  0.265 
Pupil has special needs (statemented)  270372  0.048  0.213  263762  0.020  0.139 
Pupil has special needs (not statemented)  270372  0.191  0.393  263762  0.117  0.321 
Duration since joining school to end of Key Stage 4 (in yrs)  270372  4.409  0.801  263762  4.401  0.810 
Month part of age at start of academic year (September = 1)  269986  5.366  3.475  263301  5.390  3.469 
School-level variables           
Pupil /:teacher ratio in school  270372  17.402  2.051 263762  17.374 1.888 
full time pupils/100 2003  264108  11.234  3.442  259714  11.287  3.394 
Voluntary aided / controlled / or foundation school  264062  0.348  0.476  259658  0.341  0.474 
Secondary modern school  264199  0.046  0.209  259780  0.045  0.208 
Selective (grammar) school  264199  0.037  0.189  259780  0.039  0.194 
Boys / girls only school  264199  0.090  0.286  259780  0.000  0.003 
Proportion of pupils eligible for free school meals  264108  0.144  0.126  259714  0.144  0.126 
Proportion of pupils with English  second language  270354  0.075  0.165  263755  0.078  0.168 
Proportion of special needs pupils (with statements)  264108  0.025  0.016  259714  0.023  0.016 
Proportion of special needs pupils (not  statemented)  264108  0.131  0.084  259714  0.127  0.082 





Figure 1   The gender gap in test scores at three key stages: 















































Figure 3   Index of test scores for girls
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